|
FOURTH DISTRICT JANUARY TERM 2002 [2] CASE No. 4D00-3909 [3] 2002.FL.0000326 [4] January 30, 2002 [5] SANDRA BERG, APPELLANT, v. BRIDLE PATH HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., APPELLEE. [6] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Walter N. Colbath, Jr., Allen A. Kornblum and Thomas E. Sholts, Judges; L.T. Case No. CL 97-4418 AW. [7] Daniel S. Rosenbaum and Laurie Stilwell Cohen of Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant. Richard A. Kupfer of Richard A. Kupfer, P.A., and Eugene E. Shuey of Eugene E. Shuey, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee. [8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Stevenson, J.
[10] Sandra Berg purchased her two Bridle Path lots in 1993. The lots are subject to a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, authorizing the Bridle Path Homeowners Association to make and collect assessments for common expenses. Pursuant to these regulations, the Board of Directors is required to adopt the budget for the Association and determine the appropriate homeowner assessment to meet that budget. Fourteen days prior to any meeting at which the budget for the Association is to be considered, the board is required to give notice to all members of the Association. [11] In 1997, the Association filed a lien foreclosure suit against Berg, alleging that she had failed to pay the assessments levied against her lots from the time of her 1993 purchase through the end of 1997. Berg defended the lawsuit contending: (1) that the property manager, and not the board, determined the budget, which was inconsistent with the by- laws; (2) that there was no evidence that board meetings were ever held where the budgets, including the lot assessments, were adopted; (3) that there was no evidence that the Bergs received their notices of the annual meetings; (4) that there was no evidence that notices of the annual meetings were posted on the property; and (5) that minutes of the meetings were not kept in violation of the by-laws and state law. In other words, Berg alleged that the Association had not complied with its own declarations and by-laws in making the assessment. [12] In its final order, the trial court found that the greater weight of the evidence established that proper notice was given of the assessments. More problematically, the trial judge ruled that Berg did not prove her "defenses" that the Association had failed to comply with the recorded covenants, by-laws, and the Florida Statutes "by the greater weight of the evidence." We agree with Berg's contention that the trial court erroneously shifted the burden of proof. The Association relies on Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120 to argue that it was not required to plead its "capacity" to sue as a "legal organization" nor was it required to plead, except in a general way, that all "conditions precedent" had been performed. Here, the Association's reliance on Rule 1.120 is mis-placed. While Rule 1.120 relaxes certain pleading requirements, it does not relieve the plaintiff from having to prove every element of its entitlement to a judgment against the defendant once the defendant makes a specific denial of a particular element of the claim. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.120(a), (c). [13] Although framed as an affirmative defense, Berg essentially denied that the Association had properly levied the assessments "pursuant to the Declarations of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Bridle Path." X 1 This denial squarely placed the burden on the Association to prove its case against Berg by the preponderance of the evidence. It is well-settled in Florida law that the plaintiff is required to prove every material allegation of its complaint which is denied by the party defending against the claim. See, e.g., Chatham Inv. Co. v. Sunshine Inv., 124 So. 374, 374 (Fla. 1929); Watson v. Bair, 74 So. 317, 320 (Fla. 1917).
[16] REVERSED and
REMANDED.
|